(Apologies for dups)
Lloyd,
I share many of your concerns, especially in light of the fact that some - but
no means all - security ADs have had a dodgy record in the past.
As Yoav infers, there is considerably more work to be done on the threat
analysis that has been ably begun by Brian & co. Discussion and development of
our understanding of the problem is what is called for. If this draft has that
effect, it has served a useful purpose. If some are able to eliminate threats,
all the better.
If, on the other hand, developers of a specification discussed the matter in
earnest and there was consensus on the way forward, even if some pervasive
threats were not eliminated, and if that work is held up by claims relating to
this draft, then this draft will have caused harm.
That is nothing more or less than common sense.
As to whether this draft is political, it cannot be stressed enough that if one
group of people can subvert our architecture, others can as well. Our political
statement, such as it is, is that in order to maintain confidence in the
Internet, our protocol suite should be resistant to this sort of thing, but
within the bounds of pragmatism.
Eliot
On Jan 1, 2014, at 6:08 AM, "l(_dot_)wood(_at_)surrey(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk"
<l(_dot_)wood(_at_)surrey(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk> wrote:
what it means for work moving through the IETF process
is that any work becomes subject to security veto.
if security types don't like your work - tough. it's
going nowhere. draft-farrell really widens that scope.
and this is going to mean arguments about
much more than the tradeoffs of using MD5.
for a self-described technical organisation that
does not make policy pronouncements (which is
itself a very political position, but never mind)
this draft is awfully political.
Lloyd Wood
http://about.me/lloydwood
________________________________________
From: ietf [ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Melinda Shore
[melinda(_dot_)shore(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com]
Sent: 01 January 2014 05:38
To: ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02.txt> (Pervasive
Monitoring is an Attack) to Best Current Practice
On 12/31/13 3:23 PM, Dave Crocker wrote:
We should not approve an IETF policy statement
until we have a good idea of the way we will use it.
I think this is a critical point and I agree quite strongly
with it. I've mostly been baffled by the IETF response to
revelations about internet eavesdropping, to be honest,
and it's struck me that work on some of the problems that
need to be solved to provide better privacy guarantees (for
example, fixing PKI and providing better keying) have been
pushed to a back burner in a scramble to make grandiose
pronouncements. It's not that draft-farrell is a bad
document on its own merits, it's just that I cannot for
the life of me understand what it specifically means for
work moving through the IETF process.
Melinda