On Jan 17, 2015, at 7:07 AM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com>
wrote:
On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 4:04 PM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller(_at_)acm(_dot_)org>
wrote:
Hanno Böck <hanno(_at_)hboeck(_dot_)de>:
I think this adds further evidence that adding another workaround layer
(SCSV) is the wrong thing to do. Instead browsers should just stop
doing weird things with protocols that compromise security and drop
the protocol dance completely.
Also, quite clearly, we can't yet know how the TLS 1.3 (1.4, 1.5, ...)
rollout will work out.
The WG should be solving problems that do exist; and not manufactured
problems or theoretical future problems that don't exist.
They’re not theoretical. Servers that do not tolerate (0x03,0x04) in
ClientHello exist *now*. Surprisingly, some of those do support TLS 1.2 and
Renegotiation Info. Unless those are all gone by the time browsers roll out TLS
1.3, there will be a problem to solve.
Yoav