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Re: [Gen-art] Gen-ART Review of draft-ietf-eppext-tmch-smd-04

2016-02-18 02:19:00
Many thanks for your reviews, Russ.

I have looked at the document as well, looked up the reference, and agree with 
Russ’ comment that there is something missing. I would have wanted to talk 
about this issue wrt this document on tonight’s IESG telechat, but Stephen 
Farrell has already raised this point. I am interested in the matter being 
resolved, however.

Also, Gustavo, did you get a chance to look at Russ’ editorial comments? Those 
seem worthwhile to be addressed as well.

Thanks,

Jari

On 12 Feb 2016, at 18:57, Russ Housley <housley(_at_)vigilsec(_dot_)com> wrote:

I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please wait for direction from your
document shepherd or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

For more information, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-eppext-tmch-smd-04
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2016-02-12
IETF LC End Date: 2015-12-04
IESG Telechat date: 2016-02-18

Summary:  Not Ready


Major Concerns:


The Security Considerations include this paragraph:

  Signed Marks are used primarily for sunrise domain name registrations
  in gTLDs, but other third-parties might be using them.  A party using
  Signed Marks should verify that the digital signature is valid based
  on local policy.  In the case of gTLDs, the RPM Requirements document
  [ICANN-TMCH] defines such policy.

The RPM Requirements document [ICANN-TMCH] does not seem to say anything
at all about validating a digital signature.

Protocols that make use of certificates perform some checks on the
certificate subject name to ensure that it represents an appropriate
signer.  That is missing from this document, and it is not contained in
[ICANN-TMCH] either.


Minor Concerns:

Section 2, second paragraph, I think that use of the phrase "in the
appropriate objects" ass ambiguity.  I suggest:

  This section defines some elements as OPTIONAL.  If an elements is
  not defined as OPTIONAL, then it MUST be included in the object.

The NOTE at the end of Section 2.3 about choosing an algorithm other
that RSA-SHA256 is better suited for the Security Considerations.
It would be helpful to say something more about the needed security
strength.

Why is RFC5730 a normative reference?  I do not see a dependency.


Other Editorial Comments:

Section 1: s/nothing precudle/nothing precludes/

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