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Re: [EXT] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-08.txt> (Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification) to Internet Standard

2017-02-15 14:43:04
On 15 February 2017 at 01:27, David Mozes <davidm(_at_)mellanox(_dot_)com> 
wrote:
Hi * ,
I am also supporting the insertion of in-band telemetry like INT along with 
the  actual data packet .

I think it will cause more trouble than any benefits it provides - of
which nobody has described when I've asked multiple times, and the
only one I can think of is to avoid the overhead of full
encapsulation.

It is for sure a valid use case for the modern networking including data 
center.
There are several proposals how to embedded telemetry information   some of 
them are with in nvo3 tannling protocols
(Vxlan-GPE,Geneve) Spring and other  .
I think that ipv6 hbh is the "cleanest"  way to add such info.
        1) I don't see any and advantages on the other  proposals (NVO3 
,SPRING) over IPV6 hbh.
        2))As far as security In the IPsec community, AH is pretty much 
considered deprecated, a failed experiment.They  are  prefer to use   ESP for 
authentication as well.

The postal system and the letter is very nice e example

It is not an example of insertion. The postal system uses
encapsulation to add information to letters, leaving the envelope and
its contents alone. Envelops might be a thin integrity barrier,
however the postal system usually has laws to make that integrity
barrier much stronger.

. I will treat the adding ipv6-hbh info as stamps on the envelops ,since we 
are not touching  the data gram itself just the envelope

EH's are not equivalent to stamps on envelopes, they're equivalent to
pages inside the envelope. The pages inside the envelop are only
intended to be read by the recipient identified by the destination
address on the envelop.

Sorry for excessive bolding, but I'm getting tired of quoting this
text and having it ignored. RFC2460:

"With one exception, extension headers are *not* *examined* or *processed*
   by *any node* along a packet's *delivery path*, until the packet reaches
   the node (or each of the set of nodes, in the case of multicast)
   *identified* in the *Destination Address* field of the IPv6 header."

"The exception referred to in the preceding paragraph is the Hop-by-

   Hop Options header, which carries information that must be examined
   and processed by every node along a packet's delivery path, including
   the source and destination nodes.  The Hop-by-Hop Options header,
   when present, must immediately follow the IPv6 header.  Its presence
   is indicated by the value zero in the Next Header field of the IPv6
   header."

In other words no mid-flght insertion allowed, even of the HBH option.







Thx
David
-----Original Message-----
From: ipv6 [mailto:ipv6-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Tal Mizrahi
Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 3:37 PM
To: Mark Smith <markzzzsmith(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com>
Cc: draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis(_at_)tools(_dot_)ietf(_dot_)org; 
6man(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org; IETF Discussion list <ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org>; 
6man-chairs(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: RE: [EXT] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-08.txt> 
(Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification) to Internet Standard

Hi Mark,

I certainly agree that hop-by-hop insertion/modification introduces potential 
security vulnerabilities.
Therefore, as I pointed out below, I would recommend to tackle this by 
defining something along the lines of “Hop-by-hop extensions can be 
inserted/removed/modified/processed by intermediate nodes *if* [……..] and the 
possible consequences are [……..]”

For example, hop-by-hop handling can be restricted only to a single 
administrative domain, or only to tunnels (as in the zero checksum case).

Regards,
Tal.

-----Original Message-----
From: Mark Smith [mailto:markzzzsmith(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com]
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 6:07 PM
To: Tal Mizrahi
Cc: 6man(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org; IETF Discussion list; draft-ietf-6man-
rfc2460bis(_at_)tools(_dot_)ietf(_dot_)org; 6man-chairs(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: [EXT] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-6man-rfc2460bis-08.txt>
(Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification) to Internet
Standard

External Email

----------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi,



On 14 February 2017 at 00:43, Tal Mizrahi <talmi(_at_)marvell(_dot_)com> 
wrote:
Hi,



Good discussion regarding the text about the hop-by-hop extension.



In my opinion there is a valid use case for intermediate nodes that
insert/remove/modify/process hop-by-hop extensions. Examples: IOAM, INT.

Since there is a use case, I believe we need explicit text about
intermediate handling of hop-by-hop extensions.



Imagine you sent a letter through the postal system, and the postal
system wanted to add information to that letter, that is then to be
removed before the letter arrives at its final destination.

The postal system have at least two choices as to how to add that information.
They could:

(a) unstick your envelope's seal, insert the information, reseal the
envelope so well you can't tell and send it on its way, some how
flagging to a destination device within the postal system that this
specific envelop needs to be openned, a specific page removed, and then 
resealed.

(b) take a new envelope with new internal postal system source and
destination address information, insert your letter without touching it
in addition to the new information, and then sending it on its way.

Imagine that the information to be added by the postal system is
printed on the same type of paper and is written in the same font as
you've chosen to use to write your letter.

Have a think about these two methods, what could fail with each of
them, and what the consequences may be if any of those failures occur.
Have a think of the benefits of each method, and whether they're worth
it compared to the failure mode costs and consequences for the method.



This [somewhat] reminds me of the discussion a few years ago about
the IPv6/UDP zero checksum. The WG ended up defining that “Zero
checksum is permitted in IPv6/UDP *if* [……..] and the possible consequences 
are [……..]”.



That is a far more trivial change to the packet - it is allowing a
value in an existing field that was formerly prohibited, and nodes that
did not understand that value would drop the packet because that is
what they had been specified to do if they received this prohibited value. In 
other words, existing implementations '
behaviour when this formerly unexpected value was encountered had
already been specified and deployed.



I would argue that regarding hop-by-hop extension handling we also
need to define that “Hop-by-hop extensions can be
inserted/removed/modified/processed by intermediate nodes *if* [……..]
and the possible consequences are [……..]”.


Some things that are possible to do in theory shouldn't be done in
practice, because the consequences when their implementations fail can
be severe and outweigh the benefits.

In theory, inserted EHs will be removed 100% of the time. In practice
they won't be, because implementations can have bugs and they can also
fail in unexpected ways e.g., hardware faults.

Regards,
Mark.
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