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Re[4]: unpublished public keys (was: voting)

1995-01-04 12:21:00



Jim,

Sorry for the delay in this response.  Some of this still seems to be 
appropriate to the ongoing discussion.

Author:  galvin(_at_)tis(_dot_)com@INTERNET

  Yes, there are problems with the PEM-MIME specification.

Paul, my question was specific to the thread Jeff and I were discussing,
not a general one.  If there are problems, please be specific about
exactly what is an issue and why.

I was following the specific thread.  The discussion had digressed into details 
of database modifications to support the PEM-MIME key selectors.  The real 
problem is the general one.  Much of the discussion has focused on changing 
specific mechanisms.  I was recommending that we step back at look at the 
requirements that these mechanisms address.  I believe that much of the debate 
is based on the differing expectations of PEM-MIME.  Some confusion may also 
originate from the current documentation of the PEM-MIME mechanisms.


  >I think Jeff and I could both really use some alternative >insight.

  This is not a problem of mechanisms, but of requirements.  It is
  true that many interesting mechanisms can be defined to
  distribute public keys.  Not all of these mechanisms are
  necessary.  As a working group we need to focus on what
  requirements PEM-MIME should address.

How does key distribution factor into the discussion at hand?  To date
this issue has not been discussed.

Many interesting ways can be developed to retrieve (a better choice of words 
than distribute) public keys.  PEM-MIME uses Identifiers, Name Forms and Key 
Selectors.  Not all of these are seem to be necessary.  The interactions 
between the trust models that are now allowable with these approaches have not 
been defined.

  Changes have been made in PEM-MIME that add requirements to
  existing implementations of RFC1421 PEM beyond the basic MIME
  encapsulation formats.  Rather than spending too much time
  rationalizing how a data base can be changed, as a group we need
  to focus on the mechanisms that these

Your sentence ended abruptly.  Where is the rest?

Gone ... looks like I need some integrity checking ...  

While I have been following the basic discussions on mechanisms, the PEM-MIME 
specification does not describe the problems these mechanisms are intended to 
solve (yes, I know there are a list of changes at the back of the 
specification, but changes are not requirements).

Your rationalization for some of the PEM-MIME changes are based on the success 
of PGP.  It is worth noting that PGP is much simpler than PEM-MIME.  PGP does 
not suffer from the ambiguity in naming and trust models that damage the 
viability of PEM-MIME.  PGP has a single useful naming convention that includes 
a name and a optional e-mail address (e.g. "Joe Hacker 
<galvin(_at_)tis(_dot_)com>" ).  
PGP is freely available (internationally), robust (filtering of text prior to 
MIC calculation), efficient (supports compression) and available on multiple 
platforms.  PEM-MIME has none of these advantages.

Currently I recommend the use of PGP to groups within my company that are in 
dire need of security (we have lots of foreign offices).  This is only a short 
term solution.  During the last year Motorola has been attempting to make PEM 
available to all corporate e-mail users.  Strict naming conventions, revocation 
mechanisms, certificate distribution systems and well defined trust models are 
critical for successful fielding of these mechanisms in a large corporation.  
Classic PEM (RFC142x) is well designed for application within a large 
corporation and had only a few minor quirks that needed fixing (IMHO - like 
support for MIME, improved MIC-CLEAR, alternate/enhanced documentation of 
distinguished name conventions, X.509v3 support and minor format changes for 
efficient processing).

I am convinced that some of the requirements that PEM-MIME address are not 
compatible with the original requirements of RFC142x.  These RFCs were 
carefully structured documents that forced specific assumptions of "good" 
security practice.  Classic PEM provided structure with well defined trust 
models.  Nouveau PEM opens doors to new trust, certificate and naming 
architecture's without warning users of issues lurking behind these doors.  
Naming anarchy is a feature of PEM-MIME and it supports free-form names 
certified by certificate-like structures with ill defined security policy 
semantics.  Structure and anarchy are not compatible requirements.





Regards,


Paul A. Lambert

Motorola, Inc. 
M/S AZ49-R1209           Internet: Paul_Lambert(_at_)email(_dot_)mot(_dot_)com
8220 E. Roosevelt Rd.    Phone:    +1-602-441-3646
Scottsdale, Az.          Fax:      +1-602-441-8864
     85257  USA




PS  For my own amusement I have been trying to collect PEM-MIME requirements 
from the specification and comments sent to this list.  I will post these 
separately.

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