Benefit,
Assertion by the signer to affect the policy of the receiver. Agreed
accidental DOS possibility by a (un)helpful relayer.
Bill Oxley
Messaging Engineer
Cox Communications, Inc.
Alpharetta GA
404-847-6397
bill(_dot_)oxley(_at_)cox(_dot_)com
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 1:51 PM
To: Hector Santos
Cc: IETF-DKIM
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] New Requirements: SSP must offer Highest
ProtectionPossible
Hector Santos wrote:
I suggest a new requirement:
- SSP must offer Highest Protection possible for Responsible
Originating domains (High Value or not) who desire 100%
exclusivity in their mail digital signatures which includes
- no expectation for tampering, and
- no expectation for 3rd party signatures, and
- an expectation that verifiers will follow
and honor this policy.
Even if one feels "it probably won't be used", there is no evidence
that it won't, therefore, the highest protection possible for
a mail digital signature must be made available, not excluded as a
possibility for usage.
"highest protection" (with or without caps:-) is a simple assertion
that there is a benefit.
I still don't see what that benefit is. What message (that should) gets
delivered that wouldn't otherwise, or gets dropped (that should)
that would otherwise get through?
Sorry for being dumb about this, but I just don't see the benefit,
and I do see potential for at least accidental DoS when someone tries
to help by countersigning.
S.
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