Re: [openpgp] Intent to deprecate: Insecure primitives

> My impression was that many new implementations use the RSA-S and RSA-E
The opposite is true.  RSA-S and RSA-E are from old implementations.  These 
days there are more robust ways to specify what a key is for.
> I generally prefer domain separation, but I don't think there's a relevant
> security difference *so long as* implementations do not generate a single
> RSA key such that its key usage intersects only one of {certify, sign,
> authenticate} or {encrypt communications, encrypt bulk}.
For sure, but this seperation is done in metadata, not in the algorithm 
identifier.
--
Stephen Paul Weber, @singpolyma
See <http://singpolyma.net> for how I prefer to be contacted
edition right joseph

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