Hi, Todd,
On 2009-4-14, at 22:21, Todd Glassey wrote:
Fernando Gont wrote:
Lars Eggert wrote:
I agree with Joe that some of the hardening techniques that
vendors are
implementing come with consequences (make TCP more brittle). To
me, this
is a *reason* this document should be published via the IETF (i.e.,
TCPM) - we are probably in the best position to correctly evaluate
and
classify the impact of various hardening techniques. Stack vendors
have
been putting these mechanisms in to their stacks without clear
specifications and discussions of the potential upsides and
downsides
that would let them make an educated decision. It seems clear to
me that
the vendor community is looking for guidance here, and I do
believe the
IETF should give it.
This is the reason for which the output of the CPNI project was
submitted as an IETF I-D.
Yeah - so then this would be tested across all of the local TCP
implementations including the MS, AT&T *(i.e. Lachman Associates Inc)
and possibly Mentat's fast system?
Nothing would be "tested", the IETF isn't in the business of auditing
TCP stacks. What we're talking about is describing attack vectors,
potential countermeasures and the the impact (downsides) those
countermeasures might come with. Implementors will need to decide for
themselves if and how to apply any of these techniques to their stacks.
Lars
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