Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
I really see no value in debating whether DNSSEC is 'end to end'.
Being end to end has practical benefits, which is why the Internet
has been so successful, which is why some people have been insisting
on a false statement that DNSSEC were secure end to end.
For example, the following statement of you in another subthread:
The
current design would establish the root key holder as the perpetual
controller of the DNS.
means DNSSEC involves the root key holder as a third party and not
end to end.
Feel free to see no value on your statements.
Clearly DNSSEC is only one component in a security solution and
whether it is 'end-to-end' depends on what you decide to call an
endpoint.
According to the terminology of David Clark, DNSSEC is not end
to end.
When Kaminsky discovered his cache poisoning vulnerability, some
companies put out PR saying that the issue was already known, as if
that made things better somehow.
The issue is that the concept of "bailiwick" is broken, which
was already pointed out.
Kaminsky's attack can be protected against by proper handling
of glue, without which DNSSEC cache can also be poisoned.
Masataka Ohta
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