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David Woodhouse wrote:
On Tue, 2005-07-05 at 23:40 +0200, Julian Mehnle wrote:
Receivers _must_ know "their" forwarders in order to trust them,
otherwise everybody could just claim to be a forwarder and abuse the
e-mail system.
No. This is only true if you take a hop-by-hop method of authentication,
where you validate only a single mail host.
The end-to-end methods, such as DK, IIM, Meta Signature, BATV, SES, or
even just GPG, don't require this at all.
You don't need to trust your postman when he delivers the sealed letter
which I signed, do you?
Yes, of course I have to trust my postman (and, for that matter, everyone
else who walks past my mailbox). Not with regard to the authenticity of
the sealed letter of yours, but with regard to not placing any unwanted or
malicious stuff into my mailbox.
What you seem to be suggesting is that receivers should accept only signed
(i.e. proven to be authentic) mail from persons to whom they already have
established a connection. This may be how e-mail will work in 10 years or
so, but until then, this is just not realistic.
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