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RE: RHijacked Addresses

2002-08-06 10:50:42

Jacob Palme <jpalme(_at_)dsv(_dot_)su(_dot_)se> wrote on 08/06/2002 17:40:17

Why are so few people using either of these security
methods, when they at the same time complain of the
lack of security in e-mail.

It would be trivial for me to turn on S/MIME signing in my MUA, and as the 
signing certificate travels with the signed mail item, there is no 
receiver certificate look-up required. So far so good. The problem is with 
the certificate. At what price do I acquire one, and how confident can a 
recipient be of its veracity. I can create my own self-signed root 
certificate at no cost (this approach works fine for SSL/TSL based 
encryption), but any old forger could also do that. If I physically handed 
a correspondent my self-signed root certificate in a face-to-face meeting, 
then we'd be all set, but how scalable would this be? The answer is not 
very. I could acquire a certificate from a trusted third party (assuming 
my correspondents and I could agree on one), but how will this third party 
(or their delegate) insure the veracity of my claim. They will have to 
operate very stringent controls and at a commensurate cost. So we're 
stuck. We know how to employ signing certificates across a single 
organization, and how to extend them in a pair-wise fashion (via cross 
certificates) to a limited number of other organizations, but beyond that 
I would argue we're stuck. Other may disagree. I'd love to be wrong on 
this one.

Nick

Nick Shelness
Independent Technology Consultant
Fellow - Differentis Ltd.
Advisor - Oak Investment Partners

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