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Re: [Asrg] Lets Fix Mailing Lists

2003-03-11 11:03:12
On Tue, Mar 11, 2003 at 01:17:30PM -0000, Tom Thomson allegedly wrote:
Henrik Levkowetz <henrik(_at_)levkowetz(_dot_)com> wrote:
On 9 Mar 2003 02:41:20 "Mark Delany" 
<tcrcn-6ugsc(_at_)qmda(_dot_)emu(_dot_)st> wrote:
<snip>
The one down side is that all mailing lists have to send individual
mails to each recipient and we all know what sort of red flag that is
to some bulls.

That sounds as if you think the confirmation token needs to be handled at
RFC2822 level rather than at RFC2821 level.

Someone else said much the same thing. I agree with you both that
having it as a "rcpt-parameter" is more optimal than embedding it in a
header. I have no particular attachment to either method as the
purpose here is to demonstrate our incredible inertia even in the face
of obvious and simple ideas.

This particular idea requires no more than a private token database
along with a bit of protocol support and we instantly eliminate the
need for all bulk whitelist management systems and henceforth have
unequivocal proof of opt-in by the subscriber. Yet we've let the
absence of such a mechanism plague us for over a decade! Depressing.


Btw, the idea trivially extends to person-to-person email too.  With
the same sort of "relationship proving token exchange" you instantly
and reliably corner spammers into what I call the "introduction
problem".

The beauty of the "introduction problem" is that, in the absence of
getting a token from their victims - something most victims won't do,
spammers are forced to re-introduce themselves to their millions of
victims each and every day.

The fact the spammers confront the "introduction problem" millions of
times each day is an unavoidable, many-orders-of-magnitude
differentiator that we can take advantage of, if we can overcome our
inertia.


Regards.
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