Bill Cole wrote:
Yakov Shafranovich wrote:
According to the several messages
(http://www.merit.edu/mail.archives/nanog/msg12818.html)
...........
This has implications for DNSRBLs in general including the BCP area - how
to account for a DNSRBL shutting down or being unreachable due a DDOS
attack.
The only implication I see is that people managing mail systems should be a
little more careful about whose DNSBL's they trust.
There have been issues of technical competence, transparency, and
trustworthiness raised
.........
Simply put: a DNSBL doesn't suddenly list all of 0.0.0.0/0 by accident or
because of some attack on its source, it requires an intentional act of the
person controlling the list. Using a list whose
operator is prone to such fits of pique is not a good idea.
It do points to that lists need to be operated in a resilient way, that we
might need back-up's locally. We might also consider if it isn't time to get
actors as FTC need to oversee and maybe back-up this types of lists or that
the user have a responsability of maintaining its own honeypot/internal
report mboxes, catching spam data, directed to the individual organisation,
maintaining it's own list.
Kurt Magnusson
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