Bart Schaefer <schaefer(_at_)brasslantern(_dot_)com> wrote:
On Dec 13, 9:03am, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
} [Adam Sobieski <adamsobieski(_at_)hotmail(_dot_)com> wrote:]
}
}> A number of heuristics include increasing the computation required to
}> send and receive an email, for example one to a few minutes of computation
}> per email on desktop computers.
}
} I don't think you can do this. I think you're trying to drown someone
} who owns the ocean, and that the attempt is futile. But perhaps you have
} an approach that's eluded others, that overcomes the obvious problems,
} and I just don't see it yet due to insufficient caffeine intake.
It's not sufficient to prove some value was expended: something of value
must be transferred to the receiving SMTP server (if not all the way to
the reader).
Generating "cash" with computing resources means they can print all the
money they want. For a pay-to-play scheme to have any hope of working,
it needs to be based on a resource that can be controlled from outside.
I'm not sure "controlled from outside" can work...
Which leads to the same discussion we had four years ago. Today is the
anniversary of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-asrg-postage-00
which never went went anywhere beyond that.
Indeed it is, Bart! I'll treat you and Ben to a virtual beverage and
four virtual candles. ;^)
It is acknowledged that the bad guys can steal postage from a zombied
system almost as easily as they can steal compute resources, but it's
easier to discover and react to the theft of something that doesn't
invisibly regenerate.
It's better yet to react to actual value received. ;^)
The snail-mail systems _are_ sender-pays systems, but it's only the
perceived value-received that causes snail-mail recipients to open an
envelope.
(I'm not holding my breath on anything happening with ePostage, but
I remain willing to work with anybody else with the energy to pursue it.)
--
John Leslie <john(_at_)jlc(_dot_)net>
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