What about DNS connectivity problems which do come up from time to time?
Suppose you get an unsigned message and DNS lookups fail for whatever
transient reason. If you change the current default policy you'd end up
treating as suspicious every message that arrives during the time DNS was
messed up.
--
Arvel
----- Original Message -----
From: "Earl Hood" <earl(_at_)earlhood(_dot_)com>
To: <ietf-dkim(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org>
Sent: Tuesday, August 09, 2005 7:18 PM
Subject: [ietf-dkim] DKIM SSP: Security vulnerability when SSP record
doesnot exist?
In the DKIM SSP draft, the following is stated:
If the Sender Signing Policy record does not exist, verifier systems
MUST assume that some messages from this entity are not signed and
the message SHOULD NOT be considered to be Suspicious.
I'm wondering if this a safe policy to assert, especially in the
context of past SSP discussions on ietf-mailsig where the SSP may
need to be examined always, and not just for invalid signatures.
Why is it not safe? Because a malicious domain can send out messages
with forged rfc2822.From addresses where the domain portion does not
have any SSP defined. Therefore, when a DKIM verifier checks the
SSP for rfc2822.From, the message would not be considered suspicious
since no SSP record is available.
IMHO, if no SSP records is defined for the OA, then messages from
the OA must be considered to never be signed, and any signed message
should be considered suspicious.
--ewh
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