Michael Thomas wrote:
Stephen Farrell wrote:
Yes, but mucking up a signature is already covered in the
draft whereas totally ditching one isn't.
(Perhaps "forwarder" wasn't the right term - if not, mea
culpa.)
From a threat perspective, the two are identical, right? If a
receiver in any way treats broken signatures different than
missing signatures, an attacker can exploit the preferable
treatment trivially.
Hmm...I guess so. Though the base-01 currently says (end of
page 30) "Separate policies MAY be defined for unsigned
messages, messages with incorrect signatures, and when the
signature cannot be verified."
Signature deletion is worth maybe a quick mention in threats
but no more I'd say, unless someone figures out some scenario
where this has more impact.
S.
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