ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] 1193 considered harmful

2006-03-21 15:43:12

On Mar 21, 2006, at 3:36 PM, Michael Thomas wrote:

But you'd assumedly need a new RSA signature per message in order
for this to make any sense. To be pedantic:

CostRSAsign = 1
CostSHAx    = .1

For message one, cost = 1.1, for message 2-n, cost = 1.0/msg -- big whoop. These aren't accurate, just illustrative.

For SHA-1, a rough estimate of the overhead seems to suggest the hash is predominate at about 100KB messages. With SHA-256 this crossover might become 50KB. It does suggest that distributing larger messages will increase overhead by a factor of recipients without a means to mitigate the HASH algorithm for larger messages.

In terms of adding a new header at subsequent stages, this parameter remaining unchanged in a new signature to encompass the new header also shows that the body of the message is not being changed. If one signature fails due to the HASH not matching, it can be assumed all signatures will fail due to a change that has been made in the message body. This change may help facilitate processing signatures that wish to securely add information to the message. Rather than causing a cascade of failures being processed, this effort can be quickly short-circuited. When the HASH in each signature are different, then looking for a signature with a matching HASH also short-circuits the discovery effort which also reduces the work caused when multiple signatures are allowed to exist within a message.

-Doug


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