Agree with all, except...
At 11:28 PM +0100 7/1/06, Stephen Farrell wrote:
#2 1.1, 1st set of bullets. The biggest difference between dkim and s/mime or
pgp signatures IMO is that with dkim we do not expect that signature failure
will lead to message (delivery) failure, whereas with s/mime or pgp we do. I'd
mention this in a bullet.
Fully disagree. There is no expectation of non-delivery for signature
failures in S/MIME or OpenPGP.
#33, Appendix B. I expected to see a bit here about the type of setup
we have at IETF meetings, where the IETF's MTA signs and the verifier
has to handle the From being nothing like the signer identity.
Disagree. Leave as-is.
#34, Appendix C. I think that this can be deleted. Others may disagree.
Disagree. :-) It helps novice implementers.
In any case, the text says 768 and the command line 1024, no
password handling is shown and the last part could confuse since
that signature is not usable for DKIM. So if this isn't deleted, then
a bunch of changes are needed.
Agree.
_______________________________________________
NOTE WELL: This list operates according to
http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html