Nice code, now during your testing how many messages (average message size
today 3k) per second were you able to process and on what machine. I need
something that can do about 1200 messages per second per second.
Thanks,
Bill Oxley
Messaging Engineer
Cox Communications
404-847-6397
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Charles Lindsey
Sent: Wednesday, December 06, 2006 8:13 AM
To: DKIM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: [ietf-dkim] Introducing myself
On Mon, 06 Nov 2006 10:47:45 -0000, Charles Lindsey
<chl(_at_)clerew(_dot_)man(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk>
wrote:
On Sat, 04 Nov 2006 02:03:38 -0000, John Levine <johnl(_at_)iecc(_dot_)com>
wrote:
That was quite some time ago, so to refresh your memories, I had been
claiming that DKIM-base would fail to verify if some message had its
Content-Transfer-Encoding changed en route, and that it proposed to get
around this by saying that all messages SHOULD be sent as 7bit, or encoded
into 7bit. In these days when 8BITMIME is now almost universally supported
and widely used (with BINARYMIME coming along as well), that seemed to be
a very backward step. So I proposed a canonicalization that would reverse
all those encodings before hashing.
You can sign whatever you want, but if the message is 7bit, your
signature is more likely to survive transit to the verifier.
But of course I don't want them to be "likely to survive". I want a system
that is robust enough that they "always survive".
DKIM doesn't understand MIME. If DKIM signers and verifiers had to
unpack MIME parts they would be orders of magnitude more complicated.
In practice, I think that nearly everyone uses the simple body canon
anyway.
Not at all. Going through the MIME structure of a message body and
undoing
all Q-P or Bas64 encodings is fairly straightforward, and if you hash and
sign the result of doing that, then it is guaranteed to pass straight
through all those systems which (quite legitimately under RFC 1652)
re-encode stuff en route, without breaking the signature. I shall try to
write a demonstration implementation in the next day or so, and it
certainly won't be "orders of magnitude more complicated".
So it was an issue of whether such a canonicalization really would be
"orders of magnitude more complicated". Anyway, I have been working off
and on on this since then, and I have written a demonstration
implementation, as promised, of what it would take, which you can find at
<http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl/uncode/uncode.html>.
It is less that 140 lines of Perl (excluding comments and empty lines).
Hardly any "orders of magnitude" in evidence there.
--
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------
Tel: +44 161 436 6131
Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email: chl(_at_)clerew(_dot_)man(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K.
PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5
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