Folks,
This note is about an old topic that seems to remain unresolved. I'm posting
it to see where the working group is on the matter:
Mechanisms like OpenPGP and S/MIME essentially validate the authenticity of
content. DKIM does not. For example, a DKIM signature does not contain the
semantics that claim that the From field is correct, nevermind that it does
not distinguish between "brands" such as are often implied by the display
string in the From field, versus the email address in it.
Rather, DKIM's task is to allow an organization to say this it has some
responsibility for the message; that is, come to them if there is a problem.
In looking at the range of features that have been added to SSP, I keep
thinking that this distinction is not clear. It seems to me that there is
tendency to want to build "the content is valid" mechanisms into SSP.
Thoughts?
I haven't been tracking the list all that closely so I'm not entirely sure I
know what proposed features you're talking about. The current SSP draft doesn't
seem to have any features I would classify as having these sorts of semantics
(which I agree would be bad).
The one recent SSP extension proposal I've seen is the reporting address idea,
which seems largely orthogonal to this.
Unintentional implication that such a service is being offered is another
matter. This is an easy trap to fall into. Consider the use of the word
"signed", which is rampant in these specifications. Yes, we're using digital
signatures as part of this, so the verb is technically correct, but a lot of
people read "signed" as "validating the content".
So aside from stating repeatedly that this is not a content validation service
and signatures are merely a means to an end, I don't have anything useful to
suggest here.
Ned
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