ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] RFC4871bis

2009-01-29 12:42:06

On Jan 28, 2009, at 6:41 PM, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote:

On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 8:03 AM, Mark Delany <markd(_at_)yahoo-inc(_dot_)com> 
 
wrote:

Colo(u)r me dumb/confused/take-your-pick, but is i= effectively the  
moral equivalent of IDENT (RFC1413)?

Not that I saw people trying to build a reputation model around  
IDENT (thank god?), but yeah .. interesting idea.

Building a reputation model around DKIM creates concerns related to  
replay abuse.  DKIM's signature time constraint will not mitigate the  
replay concern either.  When there are problematic accounts,  a  
reputation service could add a secondary query to mitigate problematic  
and non-rate-limited accounts of the larger domains within minutes of  
detection.  When the number of problematic accounts becomes too large,  
rejecting at the initial query may become necessary.

Today, malware, that morphs within 7 hours, is distributed through  
exponentially growing botnets where new threats are generated every  
few seconds.  A signature distribution scheme is unable pace with this  
problem.  For malware, this is especially true since reversible  
signatures can intentionally collide with essential files.  Even so,  
it would be ill considered to expect a mitigation effort based upon  
the DKIM signature can endure the torrent of signatures already being  
generated by the spam emitted from these large domains.  The numbers  
would be daunting to support for just one large domain, without  
considering the thousands of such domains.

When a signing domain accurately, even opaquely, indicates the on- 
behalf-of entity within the DKIM signature, this dramatically reduces  
the size of the problem.  Such a reputation model will be expensive,  
so it better have a chance to scale to the problem at hand.

-Doug


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