On Tue, 13 Oct 2009 02:24:56 +0100, hector
<gmail(_dot_)sant9442(_at_)winserver(_dot_)com>
wrote:
The deployment guide section 6.5 writes:
Any forwarder that modifies messages in ways that will break
preexisting DKIM signatures SHOULD always sign its forwarded
messages.
But it should in addition say that it SHOULD also add an
Authentication-Results header for the signature it is about to break AND
include that A-R header within what it then signs. That will provide much
more information to the ultimate recipient.
Before any forwarder attempts to modifies messages and add
a new signature to the message, it SHOULD look at the
ADSP record for the 5322.From domain. If the domain has
an ADSP record with "dkim=all" or "dkim=discardable", the
forwards SHOULD NOT forward the message.
No, I think that would lose too much genuinely wanted mail.
--
Charles H. Lindsey ---------At Home, doing my own thing------------------------
Tel: +44 161 436 6131
Web: http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~chl
Email: chl(_at_)clerew(_dot_)man(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk Snail: 5 Clerewood Ave, CHEADLE, SK8 3JU, U.K.
PGP: 2C15F1A9 Fingerprint: 73 6D C2 51 93 A0 01 E7 65 E8 64 7E 14 A4 AB A5
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