ietf-dkim
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Re: [ietf-dkim] [dkim-ops] key validation question

2011-04-26 22:06:47
Closing the loop (well, for our question, anyway...): thanks all for the 
feedback & discussion, based on that and the language in 
draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-07, we're going to fix signature validation when we 
update the inbound MTAs late summer.

Regards,
Paul

-----Original Message-----
From: ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:ietf-dkim-bounces(_at_)mipassoc(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Hector Santos
Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2011 12:57 AM
To: SM
Cc: IETF DKIM WG
Subject: Re: [ietf-dkim] [dkim-ops] key validation question

SM wrote:

Adding text in RFCs to prevent lies doesn't usually solve problems. 
:-)

Sure, but that is what h= attempts to trap using another level of authenticity 
requirements. We can categorized that scenario many ways but its simply about 
the domain trying to exclude an method a "bad guy" can use fraudulently.


Overall, my suggestion for the text would be something like:

   h=  A colon-separated list of hash algorithms that might be used
       as acceptable hash algorithms. (plain-text; OPTIONAL,
       defaults to allowing only standard registered algorithms).

       When signing mail, the signer MUST use one of the h= methods
       explicitly specified or implicitly using one the default
       standard registered hash algorithms.

       Verifiers not recognizing a hash algorithm or does not
       match a= value MUST invalidate the signature.

The key in the text proposed earlier is "operational choice" (see what 
Tony suggested).  It is a fix that does not introduce any requirements.  
The text proposed earlier takes into account what is stated in other 
sections of draft-ietf-dkim-rfc4871bis-05.

The point in my text is to spell it out.  Yes, its an operational 
choice, but one that does come with a non-written technical 
requirement. If you specified h=, you are expected to use one of the 
methods listed for signing. Otherwise, current verifiers will see you 
as a "liar" (or bad guy mail) when using something else. :)

-- 
HLS


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