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Re: Just say NO to key escrow or CMR/ARR revisited

1997-11-04 12:01:43
Since this probably is the wrong place for this discussion, I'll simply 
point out that every supposed advantage you give for CMR could equally 
apply to a properly designed key escrow system. Both provide access to 
data for those who have access to the recovery keys, and any system 
controlling access to CMR recovery keys could be used to control access 
to escrowed keys.

The only advantage that PGP Inc have suggested for CMR over key escrow is
that you can write your own version of PGP which puts garbage in the
CMR key field. At the same time, it builds a 'feature' into every copy 
of PGP which could at some point in the future be used to provide
government access to messages by forcing users to encrypt to a government
key. This, to Adam and others (including me), is so great a risk that 
we'd much prefer key escrow or an alternate system. In fact, key
escrow does not have to be built into PGP at all; it can be implemented
by an external secret-sharing program.

I for one do not want to see any such system included in the Open PGP
spec, but strongly suspect that PGP Inc will push it, since CMR cannot 
work properly unless every implementation of PGP supports it.