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A completely bogus crux. In *both cases* we are talking about
encrypted email. Therefore, in both cases we are talking about data
sent across an insecure network. Therefore, in both cases the FBI has
access to the ciphertext. In either case, data that doesn't get sent
across an insecure network is not the issue.
Forward secrecy in email is an orthogonal issue to CMR/key escrow.
Forward secrecy in email is orthogonal to this post.
In a CMR scheme, with a mandated government recipient, the ciphertext is
sent across an insecure network. There it can be intercepted and read by
any interested TLA.
In an escrow scheme - with escrow of either decryption keys or
ciphertext encrypted to a company/FBI key *inside an organisation* -
ciphertext *outside* the organisation is not encrypted to anyone except
the recipient. It can be intercepted but not read.
You are not making any sense here. CMR doesn't automatically give
keys to anyone.
No, I didn't say that. With a mandated government recipient, no keys
need to be handed over. The ciphertext can be read as is.
Ian.
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