ietf-openpgp
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Re: DSA and patents

1997-12-09 13:20:37
2. The Schnorr patent (4,995,082):  In a letter to the NIST Schnorr
  claimed that the DSA infringes his patent.  FIPS 186 (about DSS)
  states that "The Department of Commerce is not aware of any patents
  that would  be infringed by this standard".  I also heard, that the
  government will help if someone is sued on patent infringement while
  working on a project implementing DSS for governmental purposes.
 
The Schnorr patent is a so-called "scarecrow patent" which only applies to a 
very restricted set of smart-card based applications.  A number of lawyers 
from companies big enough to care about possible lawsuits have examined it and 
decided that any claims against typical software implementations are baseless.
 
Another issue with the OpenPGP draft is, that it requires DSA signatures
and has no provisions for plain ElGamal signatures.  If itM-4s true, that
DSA may infringe on some patents, can ElGamal signatures be made an option 
for OpenPGP and DSA be a SHOULD and not a MUST?
 
There are various issues with Elgamal signatures, the main one is that the 
keys PGP 5 currently generates with g=2 makes the signatures forgeable using 
an attack which Daniel Bleichenbacher described at EuroCrypt'96.  You'd need 
to modify the PGP keygen to avoid this.  There's a draft RFC 
draft-rfced-info-gutmann-elgamal-00.txt which covers this and other issues.  
From the draft:
 
3. Security considerations

Although the use of the Elgamal algorithm for digital signature
generation is not directly addressed in this document, it should be
pointed out that some care needs to be taken with both the choice of
keys and the use of the algorithm.  Details on the safe use of Elgamal
are given in [4].  A weakness of Elgamal when used for digital
signatures, and workarounds to avoid the weakness, are given in [5].

Ongoing research into the security of Elgamal may reveal other factors
which need to be taken into account to provide adequate security for
signature and encryption applications, for example it is desirable that
g generate a large subgroup of Zp*; it is recommended that implementors
keep abreast of current research on the choice of parameters and use of
the algorithm in order to avoid potential security weaknesses.
 
Peter.
 


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