Paul Hoffman / IMC says:
I suggest that the editors add an unambiguous reference for every
algorithm listed in section 9, and remove all the ones for which
no such reference exists.
OK, being "responsible" for DES/SK, here's what should remove any
ambiguity left:
1. The algorithm allows variable number of rounds. I say - use 32 rounds
(to be strength-equivalent to 3DES).
2. The algorithm allows variable-length key. I say - make it 128 bits
for the sake of simplicity.
3. Key schedule is described completely and explicitly in the paper
I e-mailed to several list participants a while ago.
4. Parts of the source code are available (alas, very incomplete).
5. The main "crypto" engine uses straight DES rounds, so everything
applicable to DES (source code, docs etc) applies here.
What it does is: takes the user key, does some funny things with
it that are described on the algorithmic level in the paper, use
the result as a longer key schedule for DES but iterate not 16
but 32 rounds.
6. The mode can be PGP-CFB. Text prefixed with <BLKSIZE>+2 random bytes,
zero IV.
Tom, if there are any ambiguities, I'd like to hear.
--
Regards,
Uri uri(_at_)watson(_dot_)ibm(_dot_)com
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