The multipart/security RFC (please excuse me for not spewing the
number) specifically forbids MIME agents from re-calcuating the
_INTERNAL_ CTE of a message. You may change the CTE of a message for
transport, but you must revert to the original CTE before security
decapsulation.
In other words, sendmail may apply a radix64 to the message provided
that the receiving sendmail reverts the radix64 back to the original
form. In other other words, multipart/security forbids the use of
this MIME feature.
-derek
Taral <taral(_at_)taral(_dot_)net> writes:
--tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
[ Please Cc: me on messages, I am not on this list ]
I'm sure this has been asked before, but I'm going to ask it, because I
have yet to locate a sufficient answer.
In the current PGP/MIME standard, it is specifically stated that
signatures are calculated after the application of the CTE. However,
RFC 2045 makes it clear that MTAs may re-encode bodies as necessary. The
way signatures are currently calculated, this operation (which is
perfectly valid under MIME) invalidates the signature. Can anyone
explain why this would be a desirable situation?
--=20
Taral <taral(_at_)taral(_dot_)net>
Please use PGP/GPG to send me mail.
"Never ascribe to malice what can as easily be put down to stupidity."
--tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
Content-Disposition: inline
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.0.4 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
iEYEARECAAYFAjq6ijcACgkQ7rh4CE+nYEkQ/gCeJMAPsXtQ5/j6LMxpEoEk9HWN
BPsAoPLXQ1VMF8SC6WrmZU6kS5nbEMjX
=snc9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--tKW2IUtsqtDRztdT--
--
Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/ PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH
warlord(_at_)MIT(_dot_)EDU PGP key available