On Thu, 21 Aug 2003 13:14:25 -0700 Hal Finney <hal(_at_)finney(_dot_)org> wrote:
[...]
[1] is there any way to distinguish the composite reconstruction
forgery
from a 'real' de novo clearsigned message ?
I disagree that this is a forgery. Rather, it is a reformatting
[...]
it is a forgery only in the sense, that if it were, for example, posted
anonymously by someone else,
then there could be circumstances where people viewing it might be upset
that such a message that should have been (and was) encrypted,
was posted as a public clearsigned message.
the term 'forgery' was meant to imply, that the message could be changed
in a way
that did not reflect the intent of the sender, who would never think
of posting it unencrypted.
in a sense, it is the same as the Davis re-encryption, which also does
not reflect the intent of the sender to send it to the third party
but,
in the case of re-encryption to another receiver, the sender can take
pre-cautions of addressing the 'real' intended receiver by name in the
message plaintext.
while in the case of the clearsigned reconstruction, there is no such
precaution to demonstrate that the sender never intended sending an open
message
(short of the E,(S&E) solution)
vedaal
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