On 01/05/2013 07:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
On Jan 5, 2013, at 3:22 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
iirc, there was a rough consensus within this working group that this
was probably a mistake in RFC 4880, and any future revision of the draft
should place the full key material into the revocation key subpacket
instead of the key's fingerprint.
I was about to comment that if we move on shifting to ECC keys as per Andrey's
work on them, we could just about eliminate fingerprints and just use the keys.
Also, the point compression patent expired last year.
BTW, here is my current contribution to the process of making OpenPGP
data structures most compact:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-00 . It's a generic
format that can be used anywhere: X.509, DNS, etc. Realistically, I hope
that designers of new protocols at IETF will consider this (more
superior to SEC1 :-)) proposal...
Back to OpenPGP, there is certainly a need to have most compact keys and
messages, and this is one of the advantages of the ECC keys. It's
remarkable that one can have a 32 byte public key of AES-128 strength
and my proposal lays the groundwork to make this happen in OpenPGP (v.s.
the current 65 bytes).
Given that OpenPGP messages are very compact by design, everything fits
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