On Fri, 17 Mar 2017 10:00:10 +0100
Werner Koch <wk(_at_)gnupg(_dot_)org> wrote:
Implementations MUST implement SHA-256. Implementations MAY
implement other algorithms. Implementations MUST NOT create messages
which require the use of SHA-1 with the exception of computing
version 4 key fingerprints and for purposes of the MDC packet.
Implementations MUST NOT use MD5 or RIPE-MD/160.
I'm wondering: Should there be a clearer distinction that this is for
creation of messages?
Because for verification I feel supporting bad algorithms is still
okay. Like if I want to verify a signature done with md5 it makes sense
that I'm able to do that. Ideally that would include a warning ("This
message was sigend with a weak hash alg"), but not supporting it
doesn't seem right.
--
Hanno Böck
https://hboeck.de/
mail/jabber: hanno(_at_)hboeck(_dot_)de
GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42
pgpwhUTdul2nH.pgp
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________
openpgp mailing list
openpgp(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp