On Thu, 16 Oct 2003, Martin Stecher wrote:
If an OCP agent receives transfer-encoded application
data in violation of the above requirement, the agent MAY
terminate the corresponding OCP transaction.
I prefer MUST terminate. It will make things cleaner - there is
little benefit in having an undefined behaviour, when we have
explicit requirement for negotiation already there (three
paragraphs up :}).
I think MAY is better. Think about a callout service which is not
dealing with the message body at all. We should not force it to
implement checks for protocol correctness of the peer, if it works
even with the violation.
Hmm... We may have a problem here.
I agree with Martin in principle(*), but since Transfer-Encoding
header is gone, an agent cannot reliably detect non-identity coding
since we do not document any way of describing present transfer
encodings. If we say MUST, how will an agent check?
Since we provide no way to detect transfer codings, should we delete
the above MAY? The "receives transfer-encoded application data"
condition seems to be uncomputable in general!
Alex.
(*) We do not know what the service is doing. In addition to Martin's
example above, consider a logging service. OPES should not prevent FBI
from getting all data from a tap just because two P2P nodes are using
a custom transfer encoding underneath HTTP chunks.