Can someone explain the rationale for including CRLs in OriginatorInfo
in the EnvelopedData type? Obviously you need the originator's public
key to decrypt a D-H encrypted content key, and the certificate is a
convenient way of sending it. But the CRL? If the certificate has been
revoked (say because the private key was compromised), then an impostor
may have sent you encrypted mail. But so what? You're not going to treat
that as a digital signature - that comes from the SignedData type. We're
talking about a different certificate there.
And surely you're not, in general, going to use the encryption key from
that certificate to send back encrypted mail without checking some more
current version of the CRL than the one you just happened to get the
last time he sent you a message.
--
Bill Buffam
Unisys, Malvern PA
bjb(_at_)trsvr(_dot_)tr(_dot_)unisys(_dot_)com