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RSA vs. DSA MUST

2000-11-27 16:03:33
David, is the issue whether RSA should REPLACE DSA as a MUST, as opposed to 
merely adding an additional MUST for RSA for signatures?

I doubt that there would be any strong disagreement about adding RSA as a MUST, 
since it has been a commercial requirement and de facto standard all along, 
regardless of IETF politics.

But other than the patent issues, is there still a strong technical, marketing 
or other consensus in favor of continuing DSA as a MUST?

To date, we haven't implemented DSA in GroupWise, nor in the Novell Cert. 
Server, due to the complete absence of customer demand.  In fact, when we 
looked around, we couldn't find any certificates that used DSA (granted, we 
probably didn't look very hard.)

Do any of the US DoD PKI or e-mail initiatives have any serious plans to 
MANDATE the exclusive use of DSA?  

Does anyone else care strongly?

Regards,

Bob

Robert R. Jueneman
Security Architect
Novell, Inc -- the leading provider of Net services software



"David P. Kemp" <dpkemp(_at_)missi(_dot_)ncsc(_dot_)mil> 11/27/00 01:49PM 


      Title           : S/MIME Version 3.1 Certificate Profile Addendum
      Author(s)       : B. Ramsdell
      Filename        : draft-ietf-smime-v31cert-00.txt
      Pages           : 
      Date            : 22-Nov-00
      
In light of the expiration of the primary RSA patent, it is proposed
that the RSA algorithm replace the DSS and Diffie-Hellman as the MUST
implement algorithms in the S/MIME profile. This draft will describe
only the proposed changes to the S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling
RFC [SMIMEV3CERT], and the rest of that RFC will remain identical.


Did I miss the discussion and consensus on this?

I was under the impression that RSA does not replace DSA as a
MUST-implement, rather RSA becomes an additional MUST for signatures:


Russ Housley <housley(_at_)spyrus(_dot_)com> on 07/31/2000 05:04:52 PM

Proposed way forward:  Change the mandatory to implement algorithm set to:
     One-way Hash:  SHA-1 (no change)
     Signature:     Both DSA and RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5)
     Key Mgmt: RSA (OAEP)
     Eencryption:   Triple-DES in CBC mode


The Certificate Profile should reflect the results of the last meeting
and subsequent mail list discussion.




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