ietf-smime
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RE: More Comments to rfc2630bis-01

2001-07-09 16:27:56

John,

I am afraid I must disagree with you on this issue.

IMHO, rfc2630bis should require implementation of all of the defined
alternatives.  What we are looking at here is the toolkit side of the issue.
S/MIME can come along and require implementation of only a partial set of
the alternatives by requiring a partial set of the algorithms.

I think that toolkits that do not implement all of the different
alternatives have to state that they are only partially compliant with what
will hopefully be the CMS Standard.  This is not an issue for toolkits that
are implemented for specific protocals.  It may be that this point of view
will be modified in some way by the lack of implementations for items.  But
that is the only reason that I think one of these items should be lowered
from MUST implement to MAY implement (note that I see no benifit here for
SHOULD implement).

jim

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org
[mailto:owner-ietf-smime(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org]On Behalf Of Pawling, 
John
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 2:28 PM
To: SMIME WG (E-mail)
Subject: RE: More Comments to rfc2630bis-01



Russ,

I agree that the "MUST implement" requirements regarding
support of the
alternatives within the RecipientInfo CHOICE are indirect in
RFC 2630.  In
my opinion, they should also be indirect in rfc2630bis.  My
recommended text
provides this indirection.  The "MUST implement" algorithms
specified in
cmsalg will indirectly mandate which alternatives within the
RecipientInfo
CHOICE are "MUST implement" requirements.

I believe that my recommended text provides the IETF with flexibility
regarding the separation of the protocol and the mandatory to
implement
algorithms.  Compliant implementations will support  the
alternatives within
the RecipientInfo CHOICE required to support the
mandatory-to-implement
algorithms stated in cmsalg.  If the IETF changes the
mandatory-to-implement
algorithms in cmsalg such that a different RecipientInfo
CHOICE is required,
then vendors will enhance their implementations to support
the required
RecipientInfo CHOICE in conjunction with implementing the new
algorithm.

Compliance testing is another issue with the current
rfc2630bis-01 text.
For example, how will a product be tested for compliance with
the "MUST
implement" KARI alternative in the RecipientInfo CHOICE if
that product does
not implement any key agreement algorithms?  Similar question
regarding the
KEKRI alternative?  Will vendors be forced to implement
algorithms solely to
test their compliance with the "MUST implement" alternatives
within the
RecipientInfo CHOICE?

===========================================
John Pawling, John(_dot_)Pawling(_at_)GetronicsGov(_dot_)com
Getronics Government Solutions, LLC
==========================================


-----Original Message-----
From: Housley, Russ [mailto:rhousley(_at_)rsasecurity(_dot_)com]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2001 4:23 PM
To: Pawling, John
Cc: SMIME WG (E-mail)
Subject: Re: More Comments to rfc2630bis-01


John:

This is not quite true.  The MUST implement statements were
indirect. They
came from the mandatory to implement algorithms.  In order to support
Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Helman, one must implement kari.

At the last IETF meeting, we discussed the desire for
separation of the
protocol and the mandatory to implement algorithm.  For the
IETF to have
any flexibility in this area, the protocol implementation
must support the
major choices.

Russ

At 04:40 PM 7/5/2001 -0400, Pawling, John wrote:

All,

I have the following comment to rfc2630bis-01 (in addition to those
submitted on 27 June):

1) Section 6.2, RecipientInfo description:  RFC 2630 did not
include any
"MUST implement" requirements regarding support of the
alternatives within
the RecipientInfo CHOICE.  I don't believe that rfc2630bis
should include
any such "MUST implement" requirements either.  Please make
the following
change to the third paragraph:

OLD:
[*** NEW ***] Implementations MUST support key transport,
key agreement,
and
previously distributed symmetric key-encryption keys, as
represented by
ktri, kari, and kekri, respectively.
Implementations MAY support the password-based key management as
represented
by pwri.  Implementations MAY support any other key
management technique as
represented by ori.

NEW:
[*** NEW ***] The ktri, kari, kekri, and pwri alternatives in the
RecipientInfo CHOICE are used for the key transport, key agreement,
previously distributed symmetric key-encryption keys, and
password-based
key
management techniques, respectively.  The ori alternative in the
RecipientInfo CHOICE is used for any other key management technique.

===========================================
John Pawling, John(_dot_)Pawling(_at_)GetronicsGov(_dot_)com
Getronics Government Solutions, LLC
===========================================



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