No, the non repudiation bit is in fact the number of the beast.
That is at least the conclusion we came to after the argument in
PKIX...
I think the problem here is that the only thing we can get agreement on
is what a repudiation bit would be - I make no undertaking to take
care of this key. A non repudiation _bit_ is like a solvency
bit, completely inadequate.
Phill
-----Original Message-----
From: Trevor Freeman [mailto:trevorf(_at_)windows(_dot_)microsoft(_dot_)com]
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 5:21 PM
To: Housley, Russ; Blake Ramsdell
Cc: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Subject: RE: The Great nonRepudiation vs. digitalSignature Debate
It's definitely a matter of local client policy what you accept. Even
with interpersonal messaging - the email may have legal
significance. I
would have thought that the use of the NR bit would be also
tied to some
certificate policy. The issuer may think that the policy is
good for NR,
hence is OK to set the NR bit. I as the relying party I may not agree
and mapped the policy to one which excludes the use of NR in
which case
I have implicitly mapped NR to plain DS.
-----Original Message-----
From: Housley, Russ [mailto:rhousley(_at_)rsasecurity(_dot_)com]
Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 7:02 AM
To: Blake Ramsdell
Cc: ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: The Great nonRepudiation vs. digitalSignature Debate
Blake:
I think that the language in RFC 3280 is fine for CA certificates.
I do think that additional guidance should be given to the
recipient of
a
signed message. Here is my proposal.
S/MIME receiving agents MUST NOT accept the signature of a message
if it was verified using a certificate which contains the keyUsage
extension without either the digitalSignature or
nonRepudiation bit
set.
Sometimes S/MIME is used as a secure message transport for
applications beyond interpersonal messaging. In such cases, the
S/MIME-enabled application can specify additional requirements
concerning the digitalSignature or nonRepudiation bits within the
keyUsage certificate extension.
I think that this is a reasonable approach because it
specifies a clear
behavior for an S/MIME library (such as SFL), but it does not prevent
application that might use such a library from imposing additional
requirements on these bits.
Anyone have other thoughts?
Russ
At 03:30 PM 10/17/2002 -0700, Blake Ramsdell wrote:
The use of the digitalSignature and nonRepudiation bits in the key
usage
certificate extension are not explicitly covered in the
current -CERT.
Where this would go is the rather brilliant language "interpretation
and
syntax for all extensions MUST follow [KEYM], unless otherwise
specified
here".
However, there has been some concern that the wording in
[KEYM] is not
sufficient, and that this should be addressed specifically in -CERT.
1. Which bits should be set for an end-entity certificate
used to sign
an S/MIME message? Is there a difference in this application between
nonRepudiation and digitalSignature, or can the assertion of
either be
sufficient to convey the proper signing authority?
2. Which bits should be set in CA certificates?
The current thinking is that if the extension is present, either (or
both) bits MUST be asserted on end-entity certificates when
used for a
signature. If the extension is present in a CA certificate, then
either
(or both) bits MUST be asserted also.
I'll be hiding under my bed if anyone needs me.
Blake
--
Blake Ramsdell | Brute Squad Labs | http://www.brutesquadlabs.com