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RE: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate

2008-12-30 18:37:19

As mentioned, self-signed roots have their own problems and hash is not
one of them.  They need other means to protect since signatures on them
are useless.

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org 
[mailto:owner-ietf-pkix(_at_)mail(_dot_)imc(_dot_)org]
On Behalf Of RL 'Bob' Morgan
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2008 4:18 PM
To: Paul Hoffman
Cc: ietf-pkix(_at_)imc(_dot_)org; ietf-smime(_at_)imc(_dot_)org; 
saag(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org; cfrg(_at_)irtf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [saag] Further MD5 breaks: Creating a rogue CA certificate



Regardless of that, the authors of the MD5 paper are correct: trust 
anchors signed with MD5 are highly questionable as of today (well, 
actually, since they published their last paper). Hopefully, the 
maintainers of the popular trust anchor repositories (Microsoft, 
Mozilla, etc.) will yank out the trust anchors signed with MD5 (and 
MD2!) as soon as possible.

This is a different claim than "CAs should stop issuing certs with MD5 
signatures", which is what I as an amateur take away from a quick scan
of 
the material.  Obviously MD5 is suspect in various ways, but does this
new 
work lead to the conclusion that MD5-signed roots are untrustworthy
today?
Replacing a root is a much bigger deal then changing signing practices.

  - RL "Bob"

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