My advice is to keep it as simple as possible. MUAs interact directly with
users, so it should be MUAs that provide assurance, not mail providers. This
relieves the provider from having to worry about it, and users can opt in or
out at will using any mail provider or key infrastructure they choose (up to
and including roll-your-own).
I wouldn't disagree, but I would also point out that there are a lot of
people who are eager to add a per-domain key lookup to their mail service.
There are proposals in DANE to publish PGP and S/MIME keys directly in the
DNS which are a bad idea for various reasons, but I don't see any reason
that a domain operator shouldn't be able to offer a key server if it
wants. Scott Rose at NIST and Richard Lau at ICANN have expressed
interest in the DANE versions, so I'd like to give them an option that
could work.
My main concern would be to keep it crystal clear that the key server
semantics are "foo.com asserts this is the key for bob(_at_)foo(_dot_)com" rather
than "this is the key for bob(_at_)foo(_dot_)com".
Regards,
John Levine, johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
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