ietf-smime
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Re: [smime] Message takeover attacks against S/MIME

2016-03-26 08:57:26
Some more work item suggestions (I'm posting on behalf of someone who
wishes to avoid the rough and tumble of discussion on the mailing list
though reads it):

* Making ECC an official part of S/MIME, RFC5753
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5753> is only informational.
* Authenticated encryption.
* A better mechanism than sign-encrypt-sign to get both authentication and
confidentiality (or at least a non-strippable way of doing it)
* Dropping obsolete ciphers and hashes from the spec: drop SHA-1, MD5, etc.
* A modernized RFC 4134 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4134> (practical
examples of S/MIME messages, it could avoid the fiasco of 3rd party
forgetting ASN-1 tags in their messages).

-Wei


On Sun, Mar 13, 2016 at 9:38 AM, Wei Chuang <weihaw(_at_)google(_dot_)com> 
wrote:

Some interesting usability consideration were raised on the PKIX list by
Martin Rex in the thread "another attempt to canonicalize local parts" that
could be addressed by a rechartered WG.  He points out problems with
- Incompletely specified cert chains preventing signature verification
i.e. missing CA certs and no ability to fetch them.  Fully specifying the
chains would resolve this.
- Reverifying old "archived" emails on his MUA not possible as the certs
have expired.  Fixing a verification time on delivery or other scheme is
desirable.

-Wei

On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 11:12 AM, Wei Chuang <weihaw(_at_)google(_dot_)com> 
wrote:



On Mon, Mar 7, 2016 at 10:58 PM, Russ Housley 
<housley(_at_)vigilsec(_dot_)com>
wrote:

I am hearing interest in these topics (a combination of things on this
list and side conversations).

(1) Specify the way to use authenticated encryption in S/MIME.  Note
that it is already done for CMS.

(2) Specify conventions for AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and ChaCha20 with Poly1305
authenticated encryption algorithms.

(3) Specify conventions for using Curve25519 and Curve448 for key
agreement.

(4) Specify conventions for using the CFRG chosen curves for elliptic
curve digital signature.

(5) Specify a way to use PGP public keys in addition to PKIX
certificates.

Anything else?


While I'm afraid of scope creep as resolving the above would be very
useful, could also mail header integrity and privacy be considered?
Perhaps the WG scope be split into near and long term work to help
prioritize.  The above five items be categorize as near term and the mail
header work considered longer term?

-Wei

(PS yes there is RFC7508 which is experimental, and does not keep private
the sender and recipient.  Still it is an improvement...)



Is this enough to re-charter the S/MIME WG?

Russ
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