Eric Burger wrote:
And, by the way, my mail client suggests I not trust your message, as I
cannot verify your signature :)
Signatures are easy; trust relationships are hard.
1. this is transport layer not apllication layer like S/MIME (see ISO-OSI)
2. its not about trust, its about "intent", and you may issue wildcard
certificates or multiple cn's in a cert due to X.509...
On Behalf Of willemien(_at_)amidatrust(_dot_)com
Sent: Sunday, August 21, 2005 10:17 AM
To: thomas schorpp; ietf-smtp(_at_)imc(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: RFC 2487 : Suggest dropping of
You are 3 years to late
SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Security
i cant find the appropriate WG list to discuss this.
so i posted it here.
Hoffman Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 2487 SMTP Service Extension January 1999
5. The STARTTLS Command
A publicly-referenced SMTP server MUST NOT require use of the
STARTTLS extension in order to deliver mail locally. This rule
prevents the STARTTLS extension from damaging the interoperability of
the Internet's SMTP infrastructure. A publicly-referenced SMTP server
is an SMTP server which runs on port 25 of an Internet host listed in
the MX record (or A record if an MX record is not present) for the
domain name on the right hand side of an Internet mail address.
1. will be dropped
2. standards will be extended with requirement to present valid
approved-CA-signed certificates at using tls with mailservers
3. standards will be extended to require connection with xsmtps first
with fallback to normal smtp or implement a fallforward to xsmpts if a
server/client requires it..
- no more state of the art and technology (1999), nearly all products
- ongoing criminal phishing activity over smtp
- strong and free certificates for everyone availlable at CACert inc.,
- ongoing ucbe activity, spammers could be caught and charged more
easily with their certificates as evidence, same to phishers.
- the current state breaks xsmtps networking since theres no method to
notify clients to reattempt with xsmtps.
- expected more systems ressources needed for this are more economical
than current damage from ucbe and phishing
- S/MIME is spreading too slow and unergonomical, risky and too high
effort for simple end users.
- see https, better lets do it on transport layer
- most end users and their certificate trust/intend is controlled mainly
by a well known u.s. software company charging horrent and unreasonable
fees to distribute so even approved CA Certificates cant be easily
- several local country signature law issues
- information freedom and privacy