Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference
2007-11-13 19:58:08
On Nov 13, 2007, at 10:03 AM, Dave Crocker wrote:
I'm feeling kinda dumb for having missed the ultimate flaw in the
proposal.
The goal of the proposal is to permit deferred filtering analysis,
or at least reputation analysis.
While being able to defer an assessment of reputation is a potential
benefit, it is not the goal of this proposal. Millions of IP sources
are identified as being untrustworthy when their ISP classifies these
addresses as belonging to a residential access point. While these
lists account for a sizeable amount of the spam being blocked (these
systems are often compromised), an even greater amount of spam is
blocked based upon dynamic reputations (often of their provider's
servers). The game has changed. Handling a mixture of good and bad
email must employ temporary 451 errors. : (
For ISP that host customers sending out a spam campaign, their
servers may receive a temp error at that point in time.
Unfortunately, this may cause some desired email to be delayed. Once
spamming from that server ceases, normal acceptance is restored.
This dynamic reputation tactic blocks often more than twice the
amount of spam stopped by static lists. Graduated dynamic lists are
available to suit the needs of different receivers.
Blocking an influx of spam using the temp error tactic frees up
resources needed to process other (cleaner) sources of email.
Simultaneously offering the TBR extension within the 451 4.7.8/9/10
temp error would provide the transmitter a means to immediately
complete their transaction by reverting to the TBR mode. (Fewer
transactions and less delay.)
The percentage of spam is increasing, and content filtering is being
defeated on an ongoing basis. Reacting to new methods of obfuscation
gives bad actors a significant resource advantage. The temp error
tactic ensures this finite resource is not inundated to the point of
collapse. The TBR mode would permit receivers a means to better
prioritize their backlog of messages waiting to be scanned. The TBR
mode would also provide transmitters a means to complete the SMTP
portion of their exchange. The TBR extension would be a win/win for
both the transmitter and receiver.
As someone else noted, most of this work requires the message
header and/or content. That requires message transfer.
The TBR extension does not interfere with content checking. The TBR
extension allows receivers to decide when they are ready to check
content, and what has priority.
The information that is transferred during the retained SMTP
exchange is minimally helpful, except for previous-hop IP Address.
Everything else requires access to the actual message. This means
reaching across the net to get the message for inspection.
Message content offers little assurance of its origination. Where to
reach for the message is more significant. The TBR extension offers
both an assured last hop IP address and a domain of origination.
Often the origination of content is more important than the results
of a scanning process. Receivers would be foolish to trust the
results of content scanning alone.
And this is better than transferring the message during a regular
SMTP session how?
A message transferred in the normal manner fails to validate a point
of origination. DKIM might, but this signature scheme is vulnerable
and requires additional receiver resources. With many entities out-
sourcing email services, messages will typically traverse different
acceptance policies. In the case of the TBR extension, content based
policies can be consolidated at the last stages. Without reducing
email's delivery integrity, the TBR extension also curtails DSNs when
the message is never fetched due to the origination being considered
abusive or the recipient being invalid.
We don't save cross-net transfers. We add transaction overhead and
delay.
The cross-net transfers are not increased when applying point of
origination reputation. Due to the prevalence of spam, point of
origination reputation (POOR) can significantly reduce the overall
network traffic. When blocked with 451 4.7.8/9/10, the TBR
extensions provides a means to complete the transaction. When the
receiver decides to obtain content is when it becomes obligated to
ensure the message is delivered or the MAIL FROM receives a DSN. The
TBR extension also ensures the MAIL FROM is valid without demanding
any additional analysis by the receiver.
The issue of hand-off responsibility is changed, but I have not
heard that asserted as a problem amidst anti-abuse efforts.
This is a problem when out-sourcing email services and often why
recipient lists must be continuously updated. This issue is also
likely a reason for the tens of millions of servers now issuing DSNs
containing the original spam and malware. : (
-Doug
<Prev in Thread] |
Current Thread |
[Next in Thread>
|
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, (continued)
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, John Leslie
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Valdis . Kletnieks
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Dave Crocker
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, John Leslie
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Dave Crocker
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference,
Douglas Otis <=
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Valdis . Kletnieks
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Douglas Otis
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, David F. Skoll
- Message not available
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, David F. Skoll
- Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference, Arnt Gulbrandsen
- DoS attacks (was Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference), David F. Skoll
- Re: DoS attacks (was Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference), Glenn Anderson
- Re: DoS attacks (was Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference), John C Klensin
- Re: DoS attacks (was Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference), Hector Santos
- Re: DoS attacks (was Re: SMTP Transferred-By-Reference), Glenn Anderson
|
|
|