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Re: [ietf-smtp] Compressing SMTP streams

2016-01-29 11:01:41
On 1/28/16 10:17 PM, John Levine wrote:
I agree that the CRIME cookie issue seems irrelevant to SMTP since there isn't any context saved from one session to the next. TLS has had perfectly good compression features defined for over a decade, so I'd rather that we encourage people to use those rather than invent yet another layer of goop for SMTP.

Compression has been removed completely from TLS v1.3, the outcome of the room consensus at IETF-89. It's already gone from LibreSSL and Rich Salz indicated it would be removed from OpenSSL by the end of the year. It's not just the CRIME attack, but a whole range of vulnerabilities (mostly side-channel attacks, but others too) inherent to compression that the crypto community seems to believe cannot be resolved. Basically, they're just tired of it.

There was some interesting discussion on content-based compression, but the TLS WG just didn't want to go there.


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