In article
<alpine(_dot_)LSU(_dot_)2(_dot_)00(_dot_)1602091044470(_dot_)21662(_at_)hermes-2(_dot_)csi(_dot_)cam(_dot_)ac(_dot_)uk>
you write:
Martijn Grooten <martijn(_at_)lapsedordinary(_dot_)net> wrote:
I can't see how a CRIME-like attack on SMTP+TLS could work either.
If you can identify an auto-responder which sends using SMTP AUTH PLAIN or
LOGIN, and if the SMTP AUTH and message envelope are in the same
compression context, you can use the coupling between the credentials and
your choice of recipient address to attack the credentials. Everything
else in the SMTP transaction up to that point is fixed.
Wouldn't my CDAT that only compresses the data prevent that?
If I were a bad guy, the auth credentials would usually be the most
valuable thing to steal out of the session.
R's,
John
_______________________________________________
ietf-smtp mailing list
ietf-smtp(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-smtp