] from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(_at_)PIERMONT(_dot_)COM>
] ...
] I think the main good certification can do is to stop some of the
] idiocy mail forging viruses have started.
} From: Keith Moore <moore(_at_)cs(_dot_)utk(_dot_)edu>
} ...
} indeed, if we could just make it easy to trace the source of viruses
} (so that we can detect them earlier and make it more likely to catch
} them close to the source), that would seem like a big win.
Given the imperative for Redmond-style user friendliness, how will
you keep viruses from replacing any signatures of the previous hop
with new signatures using private keys found in the current machine?
It would be totally futile to try to discuss that level of detail on the
IETF list. There's a reason we insist that proposals be submitted in
I-D form before being considered. (But FWIW, I'm not thinking about a
hop-by-hop mechanism.)
Keith