Hi Spencer,
On 26 jan 2005, at 08.25, Spencer Dawkins wrote:
- And last: Even if there is an appeals chain, I don't think the IESG
and the IAB should be in it. We are supposed to be selected for the
wrong sort of competence.
Harald
I'm really not trying to muddy the waters here, but
- I agree with Harald on this point, for exactly the reason stated, and
- this statement seems to be pretty disconnected from the "don't have
to respond to community appeals, have to respond to IESG/IAB appeals"
discussion (also in this thread), so I think we're confused on
consensus...
I am afraid this confuses me. But perhaps it is becasue I think the
two subjects of appeal and accountability for review are, and should
be, linked.
I have difficulty understanding how the IESG and IAB can be responsible
for 'enforcing' a review request (Leslie's formulation as I understand
it) yet, not have a role in handling appeals.
Thinking further this seems to create the following paths
- individual request for IAOC review
- If no response
then make request to IAB or IESG for enforced review
(and i am not clear if this a request to
either IAB or IESG or to some sort of joint entity.
and if it is to either
does one just pick the one they are more comfortable with?)
- If IAB/IESG refuses to enforce the review request
then make a 2026 appeal of the decision of the IAB/IESG
- if the appeal is successful
then the IAB/IESG makes enforced review request
- If the IAOC response is unsatisfactory
then what? appeal decision directly to ISOC BoT?
do they accept such a responsibility?
and who makes the appeal on an enforced review?
does the original complainant have the right/responsibility
or only the body that required the enforced review.
As I indicated above, separating the concept of review request from
that of an appeal, an appeal with the possibility of revising a
decision, seems to make things more complicated. Unless, of course,
the object of the separation is to replace appeals with reviews. And
my problem with eliminating appeals, as I have said too often now, is
that it makes recall or non renewal the only recourse to correct a
problem. This bother me for several reasons:
- It is too course a method. 90% of what an IAOC may do could be very
satisfactory to the IETf at large with only a few decisions being
problematic. But if one must recall the committee to fix a bad
decision (I assume that any IAOC can revise the decisions of a prior
IAOC) one either sacrifices the good for the bad, or is forced to
accept the bad as a price for the good. A finer instrument of
correction seems important.
- Getting reappointed to a position, or even the absence of recall,
becomes 'approval' for all prior decisions, i.e. there is just one
undifferentiated "moment of accountability" for all decisions.
- I strongly believe that one of the strengths of the IETF is the
direct accountability all of the leadership has to the appeals of the
participants. I.e I believe that 2026 accountability is an important
part of the IETF and should be maintained for all new organizational
structures.
Note: If i am alone in my reasoning, I will not stand in the way of the
draft going forward (as if i could). So I will probably wait until
others of a similar persuasion to mine, if there are any, comment on
the issue before making any further comment - unless of course a
question is directed at me specifically.
a.
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