Hi Russ and Bernard,
I'm not really clear on the purpose of the document. What does it apply
to? Does it require changes to existing AAA protocols? Does it add new
requirements to EAP methods that are not in RFC3748? It would probably
be good to reference 3748 when it applies to a requirement in this
document (such as replay protection, strong fresh session keys, etc.).
What does AAA key management protocol refer to? Is it the combination
of EAP, AAA and Security Association Protocol?
A few comments on this document
1. Section 3 states "This section provides guidance to AAA protocol
designers and EAP method designers."
This should include designers of "security association protocols" as
well since many of the requirements apply to them.
2. Strong fresh session keys
In this section it is not clear what the subject session keys are. It
is not clear to me what role the AAA protocol plays in "ensure that the
keying material supplied as an input to session key derivation is fresh"
Also wouldn't key caching be relevant on the EAP server rather than the
"AAA server"?
3. Authenticate all parties
What is the AAA key management protocol? It seems that some of this
section is about validating keys are used within they correct context
and not necessarily authentication. Maybe part of this section should
belong with the context binding section.
4. Keying material confidentiality
It seems that a system should also preserve key material integrity
(perhaps this is assumed in confidentiality).
5. Unique Key Names
This section states "the key name MUST NOT be based on the keying
material itself." 802.11i uses this technique; are there vulnerabilities
associated with this?
6. Bind key to its context
In this section it is not clear what the "protocol" is or how the
binding would occur. What is meant by "The manner in which the keying
material is expected to be used."
7. Security considerations
The first paragraph is difficult to understand. It seems to be stating
that the authenticator can be separated from a AAA client as long as the
context of the request is communicated correctly between parties. Is
this it?
Joe
-----Original Message-----
From: Russ Housley [mailto:housley(_at_)vigilsec(_dot_)com]
Sent: Tuesday, November 07, 2006 8:00 AM
To: Narayanan, Vidya; ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: RE: Last Call: 'Guidance for AAA Key Management' to
BCP (draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt)
Vidya:
I agree, the document is really addressing AAA/EAP key management.
Why would the scope be limited to EAP? It seems to me that
most, if not
all, of the requirements would be applicable to just about any
AAA-based key management protocol. Would it not be useful to
generalize it?
You are right. It is about AAA key management protocols,
which includes various features of EAP, RADIUS, Diameter, and
secure association protocols.
Is the document introduction clear about the scope?
Russ
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf