As I was reading this document, I realized that I didn't understand
what it was for.
As I understand it, this document embeds IKEv2 into EAP. Why is this a
good idea? As I understand the situation, EAP already supports a
TLS-based authentication mechanism, which allows it to do both
public-key based and asymmetric-key based authentication. So, what is
IKEv2 bringing to the party here? Obviously, there are things
IKEv2 is good for that TLS is not, but it's not clear to me that
EAP is using any of that functionality.
It seems to me that this document would be improved by a discussion
up front of why it is desirable.
-Ekr
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