Lakshminath:
Consider a hypothetical case: a large WG has strong consensus on one
of their documents, they believe it is within the charter's scope
and think that the document is in the best interest of the
Internet. The WG chairs assess the consensus, and forward the
document to the shepherding AD. The shepherding AD takes one last
look, determines everything is in order and sends it to last
call. A few people on the IETF Discussion list think that the
proposed specification is about to doom the Internet. A few others
who have not even read the document agree based on emails. Most of
the WG members are either not on the IETF list or choose to stay silent.
The shepherding AD considers those comments, thinks that those
issues have been addressed already and puts the document on the IESG
agenda. All other ADs (except one) think that everything is fine and
vote No Objection. One AD agrees with the few people on the IETF
Discussion list and decides to put a DISCUSS and proceeds to hack
the document. In the current model, other than the very few
exceptions cited recently, the AD gets what he or she wants for the
most part. It is plausible that AD may do this even if no one else
identified a problem.
Actually, this sounds very similar to the case where an override vote
was almost used. Scheduling the override vote was sufficient for the
DISCUSS-holding AD to ask for a strawpoll, and based on those
results, the DISCUSS-holding AD cleared the DISCUSS position.
Russ
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf