Colin,
Thank you for the review. Please see some comments inline.
In summary, this draft seems to be on the right track but has some
open issues, as discussed below.
The NAT keep-alive interval (Section 5.3 and 7) is set to 110 seconds
by default, unless configured by the home agent in a binding
acknowledgement. While the default interval seems a safe choice, it's
not clear why it was chosen, or when it's appropriate for a home
agent to signal an alternative interval. The draft would benefit from
an explanation of this choice, and further discussion of the issues
inherent in choosing an appropriate keep-alive interval (Section 3.5
of RFC 5405 considers this point, and might be appropriate to
reference).
=> Thanks for the reference. I'll include that in the new rev. The interval
was chosen based on recommendations from people with experience in NAT
deployments and the WG agreed with it. But the reference will certainly help
the reader.
The NAT detection mechanism specified in Section 5.2 relies on the
NAT rewriting the source address of the outer IPv4 header, but not
the IPv4 address carried in the binding update payload. I'm not
familiar with the way in which mobile IPv6 uses IPsec ESP, but if
it's used in a way that provides integrity protection but not
confidentiality, issues may arise with NAT devices that rewrite IPv4
addresses in the UDP payload, causing the integrity check to fail
(this is why STUN [RFC5389] provides an XOR-MAPPED-ADDRESS attribute
to obfuscate the IP address).
=> Well, I'm not sure how a NAT can do that. You mean the NAT will parse the
binding update message deep inside the IPv6 extension header in the inner IP
packet? This is where the original address is preserved. To do that, a NAT
would have to understand the various MIPv6 options, and if it did, it would
know not to do that :)
The inner header is IPv6, so a NAT should not touch that.
It's not clear that the use with ECN is fully specified. Section
5.1.1 notes that it's "RECOMMENDED that the ECN information is copied
between the inner and outer header as defined in [RFC3168]" - is the
intent that the full-functionality option defined in RFC 3168 is
recommended? If so, it would be useful to state that explicitly.
=> Yes. I think we can explicitly mention that. This was done to follow the
same rules which are done for IP in IP encapsulation, as per RFC 4213.
It
also seems that UDP encapsulation will prevent the use of ECN over
the tunnel, since the UDP API doesn't allow access to the ECN bits,
and cause different ECN (and hence congestion) behaviour depending on
the encapsulation method used. This should be called out in the draft.
=> Ok, although I think this might not be an issue with many implementations
as UDP encapsulation may be done in the kernel with the rest of the MIPv6
implementations (typically anyway). I'll add your comment to the draft.
Processing of other IP header fields (e.g. the diffserv field and
TTL) when encapsulated in UDP tunnels also seems poorly defined. The
intent, presumably, is for the choice of tunnelling mechanism to be
hidden from higher-levels, but the exact en-/de-capsulation steps
needed to achieve this must be specified for the UDP encapsulation.
For example, when is the TTL of the encapsulated packet decremented?
=> It is decremented in the same way that it's done for IP in IP tunnelling.
I can add that.
Finally, the use of multiple UDP tunnelling schemes (vanilla or with
TLV-header) seems undesirable, and it would be useful to document why
this is necessary, for those not familiar with the working group
history.
=> Well, I personally agree with you. However, there was a concensus call in
the WG about this particular issue and it was decided (narrowly) that we
should include support for this. Based on my understanding, some people
wanted to be able to efficiently use GRE tunnelling. While this is not
useful for MIPv6 mobile nodes (typically GRE tunnelling is done in the
network), people wanted to be able to use this specification for PMIPv6,
which uses MIPv6 without the mobile node's involvement. Hence, the supposed
need for GRE tunnelling.
If you ask me why GRE tunnelling is needed at all in IPv6 then I'm not the
right person to represent that opinion because I'm completely against it :)
I hope this helps.
Hesham
Regards,
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