In your previous mail you wrote:
> => not only this is very arguable (for instance about the resource
> exhaustion) but no hop-by-hop/channel security, even something as
> strong as TSIG, can provide what we need, i.e., end-to-end/object
> security (*).
> PS (*): I use the common meaning of end-to-end, not Masataka Ohta's one.
=> I added it because hop-by-hop and end-to-end can be ambiguous when
hops and ends are not defined. In the context of DNS intermediate
entities are the caching servers so even I agree your argument is
valid it doesn't apply to *this* interpretation of the term end-to-end.
Regards
Francis(_dot_)Dupont(_at_)fdupont(_dot_)fr
PS: if you'd like to discuss about end-to-end arguments there is a
dedicated mailing list at IRTF. If you'd like to continue about the
trusted third parties as intermediate entities I believe the thread
you initiated is the best place.
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